TRANSFER OF QUASI IN REM ACTIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a): A STUDY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
"CIVIL ACTION"
A recent amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows
quasi in rem actions to be commenced by an original writ of attachment,
garnishment or a similar seizure in the federal courts.' While quasi in
rem actions may be justified by the convenience afforded to local plaintiffs,2 they may also facilitate the assertion of daims in forums highly

inconvenient to defendants. 3 It seems probable that such defendants
1 FED. R. Cirv. P. 4(e) (July 1, 1963): "[W]henever a statute or rule of court of the
state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service of a summons, or of
a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or
found within the state, or (2) for service upon or notice to him to appear and respond
or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure
of his property located within the state, service may in either case be made under
the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule."
Although the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (1958) seems to authorize original quasi
in rem actions in the federal courts, § 1655 has long been considered to refer only
to pre-existing liens on property. B. Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the
Federal Courts, 59 MIcH. L. Ray. 337, 373-74 n.162 (1961); cf. Blume, Actions Quasi
in Rem Under Section 1655, Title 28 U.S.C., 50 MicH. L. Rav. 1, 5 (1951), arguing
that § 1655 is a grant of power to adjudicate in rem and quasi in rem actions. While
§ 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, and its progeny also seemed
to cover quasi in rem actions, they were construed otherwise. Big Vein Coal Co. v.
Read, 229 U.S. 31 (1913); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 329 (1838). But see
generally Currie, supra.
2 See Currie, supra note 1, at 370. "Attachment and garnishment are remedies that
are necessary and proper for protection of the interests of local people having claims
against non-residents .
I..."
Id. at 380. But see Carrington, The Modern Utility of
Quasi in Rem jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L. Rxv. 503 (1962), arguing that the extension
of the modem concept of in personam jurisdiction has eliminated the justification
for quasi in rem jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction is normally preferred to quasi in
rem and is generally available in a routine diversity case whenever the defendant has
certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state. Whenever the plaintiff chooses to
proceed quasi in rem he has, almost by hypothesis, chosen a forum grossly inconvenient to the defendant.
3 It seems that venue for an original quasi in rem action will lie in accordance
with the normal diversity requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. IV, 1962). The
Advisory Committee's notes to § 4(e) suggest this: "The necessity of satisfying . . .
requirements of venue will limit the practical utilization of these methods of effecting
service." 28 U.S.C.A. at 462. Professor Brainerd Currie assumes that under 4(e) diversity venue will have to be satisfied. Currie, supra note 1, at 340, 362. It is clear
that, by itself, rule 4(e) cannot expand statutory venue. FED. R. Cxv. P. 82. Therefore, it is likely that existing statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. IV, 1962),
will control venue for the original quasi in rem action. One of the purposes of the
federal venue provisions is to ensure convenience to the defendant by limiting the
number of forums in which the plaintiff may bring suit without the defendant's
consent. To permit venue to be laid wherever property belonging to the defendant
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will seek to employ the federal transfer statute 28 U.S.C. Section 1404(a).4
This comment will explore the availability of transfer of a quasi in rem
action in the light of the two principal Supreme Court cases construing
the relevant portions of this statute.
Section 1404(a) allows transfer of a civil action to any district "where
it might have been brought," provided the statutory requirements of
justice and convenience to the parties are met. In Hoffman v. Blaski,5
the Supreme Court settled a circuit conflict over the proper interpretation of "where it might have been brought." Plaintiffs, residents of Illinois, brought a patent infringement suit against a Texas corporation in
Texas, the only place where jurisdiction and venue were proper. 6 Defendants moved for transfer to Illinois, waiving the jurisdictional and
statutory venue deficiencies. Transfer was granted and affirmed on mandamus to the Fifth Circuit. 7 After transfer to the district court in Illinois, a motion by the plaintiff for retransfer was denied, but the Seventh
Circuit reversed.8 On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the sole issue
was whether a transferee forum which had jurisdiction and venue only
by virtue of the defendant's consent was one in which the action "might
have been brought." Affirming the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court
held that the statutory language requires an alternative forum, available
when the suit was commenced in the transferor court, where the plaintiff had the power to compel the defendant to appear or suffer a default
may happen to be located would be to increase the number of potentially inconvenient forums in which the defendant might be sued. This contradicts a major purpose of the federal venue provisions.
Presently, however, a plaintiff may bring suit quasi in rem against the defendant
in any state court with jurisdiction over property of the defendant. Upon removal
by the defendant to the federal court, venue is proper in the district from which the
case was removed, since the removal motion acts as a waiver of venue objections. See
Blume, supra note 1, at 3, and cases cited therein. Therefore, if a plaintiff seeks to
bring a quasi in rem action in an inconvenient forum, he is at liberty to sue in the
courts of any state in which property of the defendant is located, but he may not
sue in the federal forum, except on removal. It was partly to dispel this anomaly
that rule 4(e) was amended. Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C. 4(e).
To limit venue to normal diversity requirements will not serve effectively to bring
federal practice in line with that of the states.
4 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958) states: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought."
5 368 U.S. 335 (1960).
6 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (1958), venue in patent infringement actions lies only
at the defendant's residence or "regular and established place of business." It was
conceded that the defendant did not reside or carry on business in Illinois. 363 U.S.
at 336-37, 341.
7 Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1957).
8 Blaski v. Hoffman, 260 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1958).
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judgment. It seemed "plain" to the Court,' although not to the dissenters," nor to nearly half the courts which had considered the problem, 12 that consent to be sued could not create additional transferee
forums under 1404(a).
In all cases, Hoffman severely limits the forums available for transfer
under 1404(a). The decision may, in fact, preclude transfer of those
quasi in rem actions which are analogous to in rem actions. Even before
the Hoffman decision, it was argued that in rem actions could never be
transferred because the property, whose title will be determined as
"against the whole world,"'1 3 could be located in only one place at the
time the action was brought.' 4 However, some courts had held that the
defendant's consent to move his property or to substitute a bond or
stipulation for the res could create additional forums. 1 This latter procedure was foreclosed by Hoffman. In rem and quasi in rem actions
have in common the fact that physical power over property is the basis
of the court's jurisdiction.'

6

To the extent that they also share the char-

9 Quoting the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court explained: "If when a suit is
commenced, plaintiff has a right to sue in that district, independently of the wishes
of the defendant, it is a district 'where [the action] might have been brought.'"
363 U.S. at 344.
10 Ibid.

11 See dissent by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Sullivan v. Behimer, 363 U.S. 335, 355
(1960), the companion case to Hoffman v. Blaski.
12 See id. at 355-58, and cases cited therein.
13 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 2 (1942).
14 Courts construing the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1042 (1938),
21 U.S.C. § 331 (1958) apply language purportedly of general applicability to in rem
actions. In United States v. 91 Packages, More or Less, Nutrilite Food Supplement,
93 F. Supp. 763, 764 (D.N.J. 1950), the court asked whether the actions before it
were "such actions as might have been brought in any other districts than those in
which they were brought? The answer is, no, because they were brought as actions
in rem, and as such could be commenced only where the res was found at the time."
In Fettig Canning Co. v. Steckler, 188 F.2d 715, 718 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
951 (1951), the court reasoned that since "the basis of all jurisdiction in rem is the
court's actual or constructive possession" and since "the res must be within the reach
of the court," there was no other district in which the action might have been
brought. See also Clinton Foods, Inc. v. United States, 188 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 825 (1951); United States v. 23 Gross Jars, More or Less, of Enca
Cream, 86 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ohio 1949); cf. Hughes v. S.S. Santa Irene, 209 F. Supp.
440, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (dictum). Since the execution of a destruction judgment is
upon the seized goods themselves, however, these cases under the Pure Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act are not analogous to quasi in rem actions commenced by attachment, garnishment or similar process.
15 These cases are principally admiralty libels in rem. Typical is Torres v. Walsh,
221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955), which allowed transfer because
the defendant consented to appear in the transferee forum and was required to file
a bond or a stipulation there.
16 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS, Introductory Notes 2, 3 (1942). A quasi in rem action
affects only the interests of particular persons in an attached or garnished "res" against
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acteristic that specific property before the court is necessary to adjudicate
the claim, Hoffman precludes transfer. Therefore, the in rem analogy
is compelling in the case of quasi in rem actions brought to resolve conflicting title claims to property;' 7 the analogy is not persuasive however,
where the quasi in rem action is commenced by attachment or garnishment in order to obtain a judgment against the defendant which will
be satisfied out of the property before the court. In this instance, the
nature of the property before the court is a matter of indifference to
the plaintiff who is interested only in securing valuable property for the
purposes of sale after judgment. Assuming that there is property located
in a proposed transferee forum whose judgment sale value exceeds the
value of his claim, the plaintiff has no interest in preserving the particular attachment in the transferor forum. Transfer of a quasi in rem
action should not be barred when property of the defendant is available
in the proposed transferee district, and the basis of the claim is, in
essence, a personal claim against the defendant secured by attachment
process. In this situation, it is as proper to say that two districts may
simultaneously have quasi in rem jurisdiction as it is to say that two
districts may have in personam jurisdiction.
If the value of the property which could be attached in the transferee
court is less than the value of the claim and less than the value of the
attachment in the transferor forum, the plaintiff would be denied that
fairness which 1404(a) insures by allowing transfers only "in the interest
of justice." The degree to which the plaintiff would be prejudiced by
transfer from one district having quasi in rem jurisdiction to another in
which property of the defendant is located should be a factor weighed
by the trial court. The idea that only one forum can have quasi in rem
jurisdiction rests on a too facile analogy to the in rem action.
The availability of transfer under Hoffman, where two districts can
be said to have quasi in rem jurisdiction, does not solve all the problems
of the inconvenienced defendant. Where transfer under this rationale
is denied in "the interest of justice," or where funds of the defendant
are not located in other than the transferor district,' 8 a question arises
which the plaintiff's claim is applied. Id. at § 3; see also id. at §§ 34-40, 75; GOODRICH,
CONFLICT OF LAwS, 155-225 (3d ed. 1949).
17 Actions to quiet the title to land or to remove a cloud on title are examples of
this. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 3(b) (1942). See Buchanan v. Girvin, 142 Tex. 134,
176 S.W.2d 729 (1944) (partition); Park v. Powers, 2 Cal. 2d 590, 42 P.2d 75 (1935)
(quiet title); Hill v. Henry, 66 N.J. Eq. 150, 57 Atl. 554 (1904) (trespass to try title).
18 If venue for quasi in rem actions must conform to the venue provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 1391, the forums available for transfer would necessarily be limited-in the
case of suit against an individual to the place of residence of either party, and in
the case of suit against a corporation, to any place in which it is licensed to do
or is doing business or is incorporated. Especially in the case of a corporate defendant,
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as to whether the quasi in rem action may be transferred to a district
which had in personam jurisdiction over the defendant at the time suit
was brought. In Hoffman, "there was no basis whatever, other than
consent, for jurisdiction in the transferee forum."u 9 The issue left unanswered was whether judicial authority to compel the defendant to
appear in the transferee court must arise out of the same exercise of
jurisdictional power as in the transferor court. That issue turns on the
construction of the statutory term "civil action" which was not considered by the Supreme Court until Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL585.20
In Continental, plaintiff grain company brought an admiralty libel in
rem against a barge and an in personam libel against the barge owner
for the negligent sinking of the barge, loaded with plaintiff's grain. At
the time the action was brought, the barge was located in the transferor
district, and a stipulation for value was entered. 21 In personam jurisdiction was available in the transferee district at the time suit was commenced, but the libel in rem could not have been brought there, absent
the defendant's consent, since the barge was in the transferor district at
that time. 22 Thus both Hoffman and traditional concepts of jurisdictional power argued against transfer. In granting the defendant's motion, the Supreme Court injected content into the statutory phrase "civil
action." Hoffman was construed to bar transfer to a district "in which
that 'civil action' could not have been brought because the defendant
legally could not have been subjected to suit there at the time when the
case was originally filed." 23 The plaintiffs in Hoffman "would have had
no right whatever to proceed originally against the defendants on the
'civil actions'"24 without their consent. In Continental, however, "there
was admittedly a right on the part of the grain' company to subject the
therefore, it is possible that transfer to a place where none of the defendant's funds
are available may be desirable "in the interest of justice."
19 Hughes v. S.S. Santa Irene, 209 F. Supp. 440, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
20 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
21 364 U.S. at 29 (Whittaker, J., dissenting). A stipulation is an undertaking by
the defendant for the value of the claim against the property, and "is a complete
substitute for the res." J.K. Welding Co. v. Gotham Marine Corp., 47 F.2d 332,
335 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). For a general analysis of the legal effects and usages of bonds
and stipulations for value, see GILMORE & BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY, §§ 9-89
(1957), and Brief for Respondent, pp. 10-23, Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585,
364 U.S. 19 (1960). The filing of a bond in the admiralty in rem situation would
seem to transform the action into one quasi in rem. Cf. Note, 60 COLUM. L. Rv.
1035, 1038-39 (1960).
22 364 U.S. at 22.
23 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
24 Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
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owner of the barge, with or without its consent, to a 'civil action' in
Memphis at the time the New Orleans action was brought." 25
After distinguishing Hoffman, the Court turned to consider the nature
of the "civil action" in the case before it. The argument that the libel
in rem could not have been brought in the transferee forum since the
res was located in the transferor forum at the time suit was brought was
finessed by the court. The "practical economic fact of the matter," 26 the
court argued, was that the plaintiff's in rem and in personam claims actually constituted "inseparable parts of one single 'civil action'" against
the barge owner.27 The libel in rem against the barge was a "long-standing admiralty fiction" 28 and "a fiction born to provide convenient forums
should not be transferred into a weapon to defeat that very purpose." 29
Thus it was "an alternative way of bringing the owner into court" and
"the substance of what had to be done to adjudicate the rights of the
80
parties was not different at all."
This language suggests that a court, in construing the term "civil action," should look to the practical effects of transfer on the parties' legal
relations, rather than merely to the form in which suit is brought.31
While Hoffman restricts the available forums for transfer by a narrow
construction of the phrase "where it might have been brought," Continental offers a construction of "civil action" which may permit the transfer of an action "in the interest of justice," even though the defendant
could not have been compelled to defend the same form of action in
the transferee forum at the time suit was initiated.
Continental, then, is not as opposed to the holding and reasoning of
Hoffman as at least one commentator has supposed.3 2 Despite this, Farns25 Ibid.

26 Id. at 26.
27 Id. at 27.
28 Id. at 22.
29 Id. at 23. The Court seemed concerned that the effect of allowing the joinder
would be to "practically scuttle the forum non conveniens statute so far as admiralty
actions are concerned. All a plaintiff would need to do to escape from it entirely
would be to bring his action against both the owner and the ship, as was done here."
Id. at 24-25.
30 Id. at 26.
31 "The idea behind § 1404(a) is that where a 'civil action' to vindicate a wronghowever brought in a court-presents issues and requires witnesses that make one
District Court more convenient than another, the trial judge can, after findings,
transfer the whole action to the more convenient court." Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
The approach this language suggests delves far beyond what Mr. Justice Whittaker
notes in dissent to be "established principle" and "historic difference and distinction," id. at 33, 37-38, to an analysis of the substance of the action presented in each
case.
32 See 1 MooRE, FEmAL PRAcTICE
0.145 [6.-4] at 1800 (2d ed. 1961).
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worth & Chambers Co. v. Phinney33 is the only subsequent case which
accepts the analysis here proposed. 34 In that case a taxpayer brought a
refund action against the District Director of Internal Revenue in the
35
Western District of Texas, the only place where venue could be laid.
The Director sought transfer to the Southern District of Texas, where
36
the plaintiff might have brought suit under the Tucker Act, naming
3
the United States rather than the Director as defendant. 7 Using Continental's approach to the statutory phrase "civil action," the Director
argued that there was no substantial distinction between a suit against
the Director and a suit against the United States for the purpose of tax
refunds. Denying the motion for transfer, the Fifth Circuit appeared
sympathetic to the government's analysis, but felt: "compelled to recognize the distinction between actions against the United States and actions
against the District Director, until Congress obliterates the distinction
or the Supreme Court rules that the distinction is a fiction no longer
38
entitled to respect."
Thus the court determined that the "separate 'incidents' attaching to
the different causes of action" 39 were sufficient to prevent the suit against
the Director and the suit under the Tucker Act from being considered
a single civil action for purposes of 1404(a). The "separate incidents"
that the court considered significant were that venue is different under
the two suits, 40 that the defendants differ, at least nominally, and that
33

297 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1962).

The courts have taken differing views on the relationship between Hoffman and
Continental. One court has treated Continental as sui generis: "The transfer sanctioned in Continental Grain . . . is no help to respondent and intervenors, for that
decision is premised on a fiction peculiar to the admiralty law." Barrack v. Van Dusen,
309 F.2d 953, 957 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 372 U.S. 964 (1963), reversing Popkin
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Another approach to
Continental is to allow transfer when two claims, only one of which could have been
brought in the transferee district, are joined. See Hughes v. S.S. Santa Irene, 209 F.
Supp. 440, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Sparks v. Graham, 196 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Fla. 1961),
which read Hoffman to require service and venue with respect to at least one defendant. But see Glicken v. Bradford, 204 F. Supp. 300, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), which
rejected both of these arguments. Even Farnsworth considered the two cases as treating the same general issue: "We think that the Supreme Court, in holding that a
removal was warranted in the Continental Grain case did not mean to change the
general rule announced two weeks previously in the Blaski case, supra." Farnsworth
& Chambers Co. v. Phinney, 297 F.2d 681, 684 (5th Cir. 1962).
34

35 297 F.2d at 682.

36 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1) (1958).
37 The plaintiff resided in the Southern District of Texas, the proper place of
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1958).
38 297 F.2d at 684, quoting Williams v. Patterson, 289 F.2d 485, 486 (5th Cir. 1961).
39 Id. at 685.
40 Ibid.
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while court costs are recoverable against the United States under the
Tucker Act, they are not recoverable against the Director. 41 These factors, coupled with the apparent congressional desire to keep the suits
separate,42 convinced the court that transfer should be denied.
It is apparent that the line of analysis suggested in Continental and
adopted in Farnsworth provides a source of fixibility within the general
framework of 1404(a). If it is found that substantially the same "civil
action" "might have been brought" in the transferee forum, emphasis
is shifted to the discretionary factors of the "interest of justice" in determining whether transfer should be allowed. The need for such an analysis seems particularly strong in the case of transfer of a quasi in rem
action to a district in which the defendant could only have been sued in
personam. Modem justifications of jurisdiction, thoroughly documented
elsewhere, 43 have emphasized significant contacts between the defendant
and a forum; such contacts, in the case of quasi in rem jurisdiction, may
often be minimal. The incidence of personal jurisdiction is determined,
at least ideally, by considerations of convenience and basic fairness to
both parties, while quasi in rem jurisdiction may be justified only for
the convenience it affords local plaintiffs. 44 The high burden of inconvenience on quasi in rem defendants may well be intolerable under certain conditions, and the desirability of transfer quite strong. If transfer
is made to depend, as the Continental analysis suggests, upon whether a
change in the form of action with its concomitant change in the parties'
legal relations will have a substantial practical effect upon them, transfer
will be possible in almost every case.
Transfer of a quasi in rem action to a district which had only personal jurisdiction over the defendant at the time suit was brought 45
-would seem to depend on the undifferentiable nature of the quasi in rem
and in personam actions in the particular case before the court. The
Ibid.
"Congress has consistently resisted the suggestion that the suit against the Director be abolished." Id. at 683.
43 See, e.g., Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In
Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Cm. L. RFv. 569 (1958); Note, Developnents in the Law: State-Court Jurisdiction,73 H v. L. REv. 909 (1960).
44 See generally Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction,
.supra note 2.
45 It is hardly likely that courts would allow joinder of an in personam and quasi
in rem action, as was possible in admiralty in the Continental case. Quasi in rem
actions are brought because the defendant cannot be reached by any other mode of
service. The ready availability of attachment and garnishment under FED. R. Civ. P.
64 (1963) makes unnecessary joinder of the two forms of action. It is doubtful, therefore, whether a court would allow a plaintiff to bring suit in such fashion. It should
be noted that as rule 64 applies to actions in admiralty as well as actions at law,
joinder of admiralty libels in rem and in personam actions seems equally unnecessary.
41
42
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situation where a limited appearance 4 6 is allowed should be distinguished
from that in which any appearance by the defendant is considered to
47
be general.
A. Where No Limited Appearance Is Allowed
If the transferor forum does not allow a limited appearance, the action
commenced quasi in rem would generally not differ sufficiently from an
in personam action, which might have been brought in the transferee
forum, to warrant a refusal to transfer. 48 Under Hoffman, the crucial
time for determining where the action might have been brought is the
commencement of the suit by the plaintiff.4

9

This is also the time for

a determination of the nature of the civil action sought to be transferred.
At the time suit is brought, the defendant has a choice between entering
a general appearance and taking a default limited to the value of the
attached property,50 but this default judgment would not be res judicata
in a subsequent suit in personam on the same claim. 51 If the value of
46 The term "limited appearance" refers to the defendant's right to defend the
claim against him only to the extent of his interest in the property which has been
brought before the court. Cf. Currie, supra note 1, at 379. "Special appearance" refers
to the defendant's right to appear only to contest the court's personal jurisdiction
over him. REsrATEMiENT, JUDGMENTS § 18 (1942).
47 It is unclear whether federal or state law will apply to the question of whether
a limited appearance is available in an action commenced quasi in rem in the federal
courts. If federal law controls, the Supreme Court should formulate a uniform principle for the federal courts. Fairness to the defendant indicates that a limited appearance should be allowed. See Currie, supra note 1, at 379; RESTATEMENT, JuDGmENTS § 40 (1942); Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire and Rubber Co., 285 Fed.
214 (6th Cir. 1922). The defendant would probably offer the same defense in a
further proceeding in personam on the same claim, however, to which the normal
rules of collateral estoppel arguably should apply. See REsrATEMENT, JuDGMENTs
§§ 70(c), 76(2)(c) (1942). Given this, the defendant has little to gain by the limited
appearance, except that the further claim may not be prosecuted since the plaintiff
could have sued initially in personam. Nevertheless, the all or nothing choice compelled by the general appearance would seem to work an undue hardship on the
defendant who has been truly inconvenienced by the location of the suit. But ci.
Note, The "Right" to Defend Federal Quasi-in-Rem Actions Without Submitting to
the PersonalJurisdiction of the Court, 48 IowA L. REv. 441 (1963).
48 The trend indicated by the recent amendments and the broadening of state
process "would seem to render increasingly tenuous the technical 'jurisdictional' distinctions between actions in personam and those in rem." Elliott and Green, The
Proposed Amendments to Rule 4, 48 IowA L. RFv. 300, 310 (1963).
49 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 343 (1961).
50 Without jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, a court clearly cannot
enter a judgment for a value greater than the value of the attached or garnished
property. RESrATFMENT, JUDGMENTS § 34(f) (1942); see also Currie, supra note 1, at 348.
51 Strand v. Halverson, 220 Iowa 1276, 264 N.W. 266 (1935) (garnishment); Saunders
v. King, 69 Ohio App. 313, 37 N.E.2d 92, 93 (1941) (attachment); RESTATEMIENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 34(h), 76(c) (1942); see Salmon Falls Mfg. Co. v. Midland Tire & Rubber Co..
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the property is equal to or greater than the value of the plaintiff's claim,
the right to take a default would be insignificant and transfer should not
be barred. If the value of the property is less than the value of the plaintiff's claim, transfer will depend on the practical significance to the parties of the defendant's right to take a default judgment. It is submitted
that this right has no practical significance. The defendant, appearing
to move for transfer and thereby submitting himself to the general jurisdiction of the court, indicates that he is not interested in availing himself of his limited default option. Also, the plaintiff should not be heard
to resist transfer to a more convenient forum on the ground that the
defendant's option, in which the defendant has shown no interest, deserves protection. Therefore, where a limited appearance is not allowed,
an action commenced quasi in rem should not be considered different
from an in personam action which might have been brought in the
transferee forum. In this situation, quasi in rem jurisdiction would sim'52
ply be "an alternative method of bringing the defendant into court.
If the defendant appears to contest the claim against his property, he
subjects himself to the general power of the court; otherwise he defaults.
The compelling policies of convenient and inexpensive trials, central to
1404(a), weigh heavily in favor of transfer of this quasi in rem action to
the more convenient forum, providing "the interest of justice" is satisfied.
B. Where a Limited Appearance Is Allowed
When a limited appearance is available in the transferor forum, the
.question of transfer of a quasi in rem action to a district which had
only in personam jurisdiction at the time suit was brought turns on the
materiality of the defendant's right to defend the limited claim against
his property. Lacking waiver or consent to a general appearance, the
285 Fed. 214, 219 (6th Cir. 1922); Cheshire Nat. Bank v. Jaynes, 224 Mass. 14, 18, 112
N.E. 500, 502 (1916); Annot., 103 A.L.R. 839 (1936).
52 Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960). The plaintiff's
interest in securing valuable property of the defendant's out of which judgment is
certain to be exacted in a swift and expeditious manner, does not offer an obstacle
to transfer. Procedures for securing the defendant's property are readily available in
state courts, and in federal courts by rule 64. Where in personam jurisdiction can
be obtained, the judgment may be executed on the defendant's property in any district in the United States, and in general it would appear likely that a district with
in personam jurisdiction would also contain some property of the defendant's which
could be brought before the court. At any rate, delay in execution of judgment occasioned by the lack of the defendant's property in the forum district would normally
not be an inconvenience of such magnitude that the possibility of transfer under
§ 1404(a), assuming the other standards of "the interest of justice" can be met, should
be foreclosed by the trial court. If it should appear likely that the financial or personal property of the defendant will disappear or waste before execution can be made,
and security of judgment is important in the case before the court, transfer may
properly be denied "in the interest of justice."
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value of the judgment will not exceed the value of the res.53 When the
value of the res exceeds the amount of the claim, the limited appearance
serves no purpose, and transfer should not be barred. If the value of
the res is less than the amount of the claim, the defendant's right to a
limited appearance is certainly, in the normal instance, a right of considerable significance. But, like default, the possibility that the defendant may exercise his right is not necessarily relevant to the question of
transfer. Since the defendant seeks to transfer to a forum in which personal jurisdiction was available at the time suit was brought, the court
should require that he proceed in personam as a condition of transfer.
The defendant is thereby made to "waive" his right to a limited appearance in the transferee forum by his motion to transfer, and this right
is no longer of importance to him for purposes of 1404(a). Similarly,
the plaintiff would have no interest in the defendant's right to a limited
appearance, except as an element to defeat transfer. It would seem,
therefore, that where the defendant seeks transfer of a quasi in rem
action to a forum which had only in personam jurisdiction, and he is
made liable in personam in the transferee court, the factor of the limited
appearance should not defeat transfer.
C. Disposition of the Res
A final problem centers on the disposition of the res upon transfer.54
Two possible solutions appear: the attachment or garnishment may be
either vacated or held by the transferor court. 55 Under existing state
53 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 39 (1942).
54 This problem was neither argued before

nor considered by the Court in Continental. This result may be premised on the assumption that federal district courts
have power of disposition through their independent admiralty jurisdiction. Nevertheless, from the silence in Continental, a hesitant argument may be made that disposition of the res is not a critical factor governing transfer.
55 While the issue has not been decided, it would appear that state law will control
the disposition of the res upon transfer. Rule 4(e) of the Feddral Rules of Civil Procedure is couched in terms of state law. Also, rule 64 seems to cover disposition as
well as commencement of the attachment: "At the commencement of and during the
course of an action, all remedies providing for seizure of person or property for the
purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgement ultimately to be entered in the
action are available under the circumstances and in the manner provided by the law
of the state in which the district court is held." However, the interests of uniformity and the efficient administration of federal business argue for the opposite
result. Moreover, since most states allow attachments on property situated outside
the district in which the action is prosecuted (e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 11, § 13 (1961);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 76.16 (1941)), the issue of vacature on transfer does not arise. Therefore, whether the plaintiff has the right to defeat vacature by refusing to consent to
the defendant's bond (see Fazzano v. Martin, 94 Conn. 91, 108 Atd. 512, 513 (1919)
(dictum), suggesting this is the case), or whether the transferor court has the power
to vacate for this type of cause, is a matter open to statutory construction in each
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law, it may sometimes be the case that vacature is only obtainable with
the plaintiff's consent.5 6 This fact seems to present the consent issue
again, but it is a different issue from that with which Hoffman deals.
Unlike the troublesome consent in Hoffman, consent to vacature in no
way affects the power of the plaintiff to subject the defendant to suit
on the same "civil action" in the transferee forum. It is merely an attendant consequence to the bringing of suit initially in the transferor
forum. The right to determine the disposition of the res does not seem
substantial enough to warrant judicial protection for the purpose of
transfer.57 Generally, when the defendant is amenable to personal jurisdiction in a routine diversity case, execution of judgment on the property of the defendant within a reasonable time is to be expected.
The other solution to the problem of the disposition of the res is that
the property be kept in the transferor forum and disposed of in accordance with the judgment of the transferee court. By its terms, rule 4(e)
conforms procedures for attachment and garnishment in the federal
courts to those in the states. 58 Nevertheless, while an original writ of
attachment or garnishment may only be served on property within the
state in which suit is brought, this has nothing to do with whether, upon
transfer, the same property may be held in the transferor court awaiting
judgment in the transferee forum. The traditional objection that a
forum which does not have property within its territorial jurisdiction
cannot adjudicate claims to that property seems valid for state,59 but
arguably inapposite for federal forums. 60 A state has no sovereignty nor
jurisdictional power beyond the limits of its physical territory. Federal
courts, however, derive their jurisdictional power from the sovereignty
of the United States, which power is, at least potentially, coextensive
with national boundaries. 61 Therefore, it is arguable that, upon transfer,
a federal district court has power to adjudicate claims to property which
has been properly attached or garnished by any other federal district
state. As the state statutes do not deal with the problem of vacature on transfer,
it is arguable that the federal courts should decide the issue on their own.
56 E.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Aar § 6222; MINN. ANN. STAT. §§ 570.09-12 (1947).
57 See note 52 supra.
58 See note 1 supra.

59

RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS

§ 34(b) (1942).

60 At least in a federal question case. If, however, the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), is based on a constitutional command that a federal diversity
court is to act as another court of the state in which it sits, then considerations founded
on conceptions of state territorial sovereignty may be relevant. But cf. Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
61 R1srATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 5(b) (1942). "Congress might have authorized civil
process from any circuit court, to have run into any state of the Union." Toland v.
Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300, 328 (1838).
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court. The uniform registration of judgments in all federal district
courts62 seems to invite utilization in this fashion.

The analysis here applied to the transfer of a quasi in rem action seeks
to ascertain, in a practical fashion; the significant legal consequences of
a change in the form of action occasioned by transfer. The conclusion
of this comment is that under most circumstances transfer of a quasi in
rem action should not be barred simply by the fact that personal, and
not quasi in rem jurisdiction, is available in the transferee forum. For
purposes of transfer, the practical consequences of the right to default,
to enter a limited appearance and to vacate the res are not substantial
enough to bar a change of venue for the civil action commenced quasi
in rem. This result allows the trial judge to determine, within the
broad area of discretion afforded him, in which forum the litigation
should most conveniently and inexpensively proceed.
62 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1958); cf. Blume, Actions Quasi in Rem under Section 1655,
28 U.S.C., 50 MxcH. L. REv. 1, 31-32 (1951).

